本课程将为你介绍现代哲学中的一些研究领域。在每个模块中，将由不同的哲学家为你讲述其专业领域内最重要的疑问和问题。 首先，我们来了解什么是哲学，哲学有哪些独特的目标与方法以及哲学与其他学科有何不同？之后，我们会在课程剩余的时间内向你简要介绍各种哲学领域的总体情况。你要学习的主题包括：知识论，其中将讨论囊括我们对世界和我们自身的了解以及如何获取这些知识；科学哲学，我们将在此模块中调查科学研究和实践中的基础概念问题；心灵哲学，我们将在此模块中询问物质拥有心灵的意义以及应如何理解和诠释心灵；道德哲学，我们将在此模块中探究道德判断和反应的本质，看它们是旨在得出客观的道德真相，还是仅作为个人或文化偏好，以及，形而上学，我们将在此模块中思考有关事实本质的一些基础概念问题。 本慕课 (MOOC) 课程由爱丁堡大学 Eidyn 研究中心领导设计。为配合“哲学导论”的授课，我们为大家倾力推荐一本由 Routledge 出版社出版的名为 "Philosophy for Everyone" 的配套书籍。这本“哲学导论”的课程配套书籍是由爱丁堡大学哲学小组为满足慕课 (MOOC) 学生要求而编写的。"Philosophy for Everyone"一书中包含清晰易懂的章节、章节摘要、词汇表、探究问题、补充阅读推荐以及在线资源指南。 This is a translated version. To join the original English version, Please visit this page https://www.coursera.org/learn/philosophy
针对客观主义、相对主义以及情绪主义提出的异议
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哲学导论（中文版）
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道德：客观、情绪还是相对？ - Matthew Chrisman
生活中，我们都具有某种区分善恶的能力，也能判断自己的哪些行事方式较好，哪些较为不妥。 但是，这些道德信念、道德感或道德观有着怎样的地位呢？ 我们是应当将其视为反映周围世界上客观存在的事实、科学家可以探索和研究的对象？ 还是应将道德判断视为仅用于表达个人或文化偏好的措辞？ 在本模块中，我们将审视思考这些疑问时可以采取的不同视角，以及这些视角各自面临的问题和前景。
Conheça os instrutores
Dr. Dave WardLecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Duncan PritchardProfessor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Michela MassimiFull Professor
Philosophy
Dr. Suilin LavelleLecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Dr. Matthew ChrismanReader in Philosophy
Philosophy
Dr. Allan Hazlett
Dr. Alasdair RichmondDr.
Philosophy
We've been discussing the status of morality, the status of moral judgements.
And I've introduced three broad brush approaches to answering
questions about the status of morality.
The first approach is objectivism, so
the idea that our moral judgements are about objective matters of fact.
So as a comparison, think about our empirical judgments about
the observable world around us, or the world as is discovered by science.
So, those seem to be, the empirical judgments seem to be objective.
The objectivism about morality says that moral judgments are also objective
in a similar way.
The second view is relativism, so,
the relativist idea is that our moral judgements are true or false,
that only relative to something, like our culture, our feelings.
So as a rough analogy, think again about our statements of law,
like our traffic laws, one must drive on the left,
it's true relative to one country, false relative to another country.
So the moral relativist thinks something similar is the case for moral judgements,
they're true relative to one culture, or one person's feelings, but
possibly false relative to another culture, or another person's feelings.
The final view that I introduced was emotivism.
So this was the idea that our moral judgements aren't the expression of
beliefs about objective or relative facts, but
rather the expression of our moral emotions.
The expression of our approval or disapproval about something.
Which of these views is right?
Which one do you think is right?
This is a really large question, one that we're not going to settle today.
It's the foundational question of an area of moral philosophy called meta ethics,
the area of philosophy that I work most on.
And in the contemporary discussion we see all sorts of different theories
that pick up on one or another strand from these three basic approaches.
So today were not going to settle the huge question of which ones the right one?
Maybe these three, none of them is the right one, but
we need some refined more nuanced view that overlaps one, or more,
these views, one or more of these basic approaches.
But what we can do today is think about one main objection to each theory.
And by thinking about one main objection to each theory we can refine our views
towards these theories.
Are they a good starting point to work out further,
or are they the beginning of a dead end that is going to go nowhere.
So, it's good philosophical methodology to think about your preferred view
about something, and then whatever you take to be the best objection,
is it possible to overcome that objection?
So what I'm going to do in the rest of this lecture is to introduce one main
objection to each of these theories, and
think a little bit about whether that objection undermines the theory.
Okay, so here's an objection to objectivism.
Remember the objectivist thinks our moral judgements are the sorts of
things that can be true or false, and when they're true, they're objectively true.
Like the empirical judgements made in science are objectively true.
But you might think, well, there's an important disanalogy between
our moral judgements and our empirical judgements.
When somebody disagrees with us about some empirical matter,
there is a method that we could use to go out and verify the right opinion.
We can observe reality and the determine whether it was indeed sunny in Edenburg,
for example, or whether the earth indeed does rotate around the sun.
These sorts of judgements look like they admit of empirical verification through
some sort of observational method.
The same doesn't seem to be true in the case of morality.
With a moral judgement, like genocide is morally abhorrent, or
polygamy is morally dubious.
If somebody disagrees with you it seems difficult to know what method we would use
to settle the issue.
How do we figure out who's right about the issue?
It doesn't look like we can observe the world and
find the moral facts in the same way that we can with the empirical facts.
So, this basic disanalogy is the challenge to objectivism.
Can we objectivists explain this basic disanalogy?
The second objection I want to talk about is an objection to relativism,
remember that the relativist thinks that our moral judgments are true or false.
But they're only true or false relative to somebody's culture, or
someone's individual subjective moral feelings.
But if that's right, it seems like it's hard to make sense of moral progress.
So, we think that morality, humanity gets better at being moral in certain way.
So, for example in the past, people thought that slavery was perfectly fine,
but now we think that slavery is morally abhorrent.
That seems like a piece of moral progress, we've gone from a bad view to a good view.
But if the Relativist view is right, somebody in the past said slavery's
morally okay, that could be true relative to that culture.
Whereas somebody now that says slavery's morally wrong,
that could be true relative to our culture.
And there's sort of difference in opinion,
but there's no progress in opinion, so, the basic challenge here for
the relativism is to explain the possibility of more progress.
The final objection I want to discuss is an objection to emotivism.
Remember that emotivism is the idea that our moral judgments aren't beliefs about
matters of fact, either objective or relative,
they're expressions of our emotions, our motor reactions to things.
They're like saying, boo for polygamy, or hooray for charity.
The challenge this view faces is that it looks like we sometimes
reason our way to our moral views, our moral opinions.
But if Emotivism is right, then our moral opinions are just an emotive
reactions that are not recent response to questions about morality.
So think about that example of Oedipus' sleeping his mother,
Jocasta, was morally bad.
You might have initially thought, that's right, but then,
reasoning, well, Oedipus didn't know it was his mother, and so
it wasn't culpable what he did, come to think, well, it wasn't morally bad.
So that kind of transition, changing your mind through reason, is really hard for
the emotivist to explain.
Because the emotivist thinks that the ultimate judgements that you make,
when you make moral judgements, they're a emotive reactions,
not reasoned responses to beliefs about the way things are with morality.
So the basic challenge to emotivism is to explain how we can reason to our moral
views I've discussed challenges for each of the three views that we've discussed.
So the challenge to emotivism was to explain the difference in our methodology
in determining whether something's right or wrong, and
determining whether some empirical judgement is true or false.
There seems to be an important difference there.
The objection to relativism was to make sense of the possibility of moral
progress, and the objection to emotivisim was to explain how it's possible
that we reason to our moral opinions sometimes.
Can these objections be met?
Of course, this is where our philosophy debates, various objections and responses,
and tries to develop new theories.
For example, the objectivist could argue that sometimes we do use
empirical observation to determine what's right and wrong.
For example, many objectivist think that what's right and wrong is determined by
what maximizes overall happiness, and we can go out and measure different policies
as to whether they promote, or don't promote, overall happiness.
That's something that you can observe.
Alternatively, the objectivists could say, look, in the case of Mathematics,
we think there's an objectively true or false answer to many questions.
But we don't think you can observe that answer, not with your eyes and your ears,
but we have powers of rational reflection, or intuition,
that we can come to figure out the objective of that answer.
So these are a couple of the types of responses
the objectivists might give to that objection.
The relativists, the problem with the relativists was of course they can't
make sense of moral progress, that was the claim.
But relativists argue that different cultures overlap, and
so as long as we could see, for example the slavery in America
in the 18th century as part of our cultural heritage now.
You can see that cultures overlapping with our culture, and so
there is moral disagreement there because there’s cultural overlap,
it’s not two radically different cultures.
So that’s a possible response by the relativist to the injection of moral
progress.
Finally, the emotivist can say, remember that the objection was that the emotivist
can't make sense about the way we reason to our moral opinions.
But the emotivist could say, look,
some of our evaluative reactions to things are in the space of reasons.
They are the sorts of things we can reason to.
For example, if you prefer A to B and B to C, but you prefer C to A,
there's something wrong with your preferences, they're irrational.
This is something that's well studied by theorists of preference,
theorists of rational preference and choice.
That seems like the sort of thing that you could then reason your way to say, well,
I need to change my preference about A and C somehow.
To sort this out so that it's not irrational.
But those preferences, they are beliefs in objective matters of fact, or
relative to matters of facts, they're a valuative attitude.
So if you thought of our moral attitudes, our moral judgments as preferences,
and when we make moral claims, we're expressing a certain kind of
moral preference rather than just an emotive reaction.
Then they maybe they emotivism this is more fine version of emotivism
can answer that challenge that we can make sense of the way reason are more of views.
So again, that's just one possible response to the objection I mention for
each of these three theories.
You'll have to think to yourself about whether you think those responses
are compelling, or whether there's then counter objections that come up because of
the response, but this is the methodology of good philosophy.
Thinking about how we can refine our views, refine our initial intuitions and
opinions in light of the types of objections that
people who have different views from us would raise in order to get closer and
closer to what we think is the right view about the status of morality.
So, that's what I wanted to talk to you about today by considering the three
theories, and then also considering the objections.
It's been a pleasure talking to you about the status of morality.
These lectures have been free and open to the public and so
I was wondering if I could ask a favor of you back.
My favorite charity is a charity called Partners in Health,
who's doing some amazing work in public health and
health care access in places like Rwanda, and Malawi, and Mexico.
So if you'd like to give a little tip to this lecture,
you could click on the link to www.pih.org and
give a small donation to Partners in Health, I would really appreciate it.
Thank you.
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