[MUSIC] [MUSIC] The previous section showed us how the black box, this black box of implementation of political processes could be broken up into three variables: configuration of the actor, power relations and the strategies deployed by these actors. During this section, we will look closer at one of these three variables - the strategies actors deploy when faced with these rules, how they will position themselves in relation to the rules. This is referred to as law activation strategies. On the slide, you have the definition of the law activation strategies which are ultimately the actions through which actors will select the rule and the activation procedures that appear to most enable their objectives. We are looking at an opportunistic perspective of how to activate the rule. The rule is no longer just a constraint placed on actors but is also an opportunity for them to achieve their goals. In that context, actors will not necessarily aim to implement the rules. Instead, they will might adopt other behaviours such as circumvention, diversion, innovation of the rules. The implementation of solutions will go even further. The following diagram illustrates this reality. On one side there is an institutional regime with many rules, Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 3… hypothetically, these rules are potentially conflicting, and actors will finally select the rule that will do the most to achieve their objectives and an activation strategy as we described. It might be passivity, realization, diversion, circumvention or innovation. Lets try to enter into the details of these activation strategies and give a definition and examples. This is what happens: firstly, there is passiveness which leads to a strategy where an actor will eventually decide to do nothing. An actor may deliberately decide this or he might be forced to do nothing. Maybe there is a lack of resources to activate a rule or because he is unaware that the rule exists. A typical example. An actor, a target group for public policy, that does not ask for subsidies because he does not know he has the option to apply for a grant. Another example is when an authority will waive a rule because there are not sufficient financial resources, because there are not sufficient human resources. A third example is the case where an organisation for the protection of the environment will not renounce a decision it deems contrary to a law on environmental protection, not because it does not want to enforce the law but because it has already allocated its resources to other cases. So, this passivity is not necessarily decided deliberately. It can also be imposed by external circumstances beyond the control of the actors. This is the first case. The second is the realization. This is the strategy through which an actor will attempt to apply a rule or closely apply a rule. Even in these cases the application of the rule is not totally mechanical. There is instead a certain margin to move, the possibility to adjustment, to pull the rule in one direction or another. The third strategy is diversion through which an actor will seek to enable a rule not only to achieve the objectives for which it was adopted, but to reach objectives of their own. A typical example is the case of the grant, when an actor will seek agricultural subsidy for purposes other than agriculture, or the same with an energy subsidy. So a grant is acquired for other objectives such as for tourism or the renovation of a building. Objectives that have nothing to do with the objectives of public policy. The fourth strategy is circumvention. It is a strategy that we know well. A strategy through which actors resist the application of a rule. This is a very common strategy among target groups of public policy who do not always regard the behaviour changes that are expected of them favourably and who are in denial about the reality of the situation. There are two types of circumvention. There may be situations where there is a bypass which remains within the rule because the actor will be able to bypass the rule without his behaviour having consequences. In these cases, there is a situation on the ground which goes against the institutional regime. It will continue without consequences, without anyone flagging this situation. The other case of circumvention is when an actor tries to get around the rule by applying it in a way that goes against public policy. A traditional opposition structure is the opposition between public policy and property rights and an actor will try to oppose the implementation of a public policy by invoking his right to property. These cases of circumvention by confrontation will often end up before the courts and then it is an outside entity that will settle the rivalry. The last case is more original. The case of innovation. A strategy for innovation through which actors will seek to go beyond what is provided by the institutional regime, to establish rules which respond more to local issues around the resource. Typically, an association, an organisation for the protection of the environment will seek to put in place protection arrangements for water resources that are stricter than those provided within public policies. Now you have seen these five activation strategies. Passivity, realization, diversion, circumvention and innovation. Here is a question which will take you back to the video you saw in section 2.7: Can you try to determine the activation strategies deployed by the actors in this video? In the context of the creation of artificial snow in Téléveysonnaz, it is clear enough. Téléveysonnaz, an influential actor tries to circumvent the institutional regime. It is a circumvention of the rule because he knows that his behaviour will have no consequences. Why will this behaviour have no consequences? Because the other actors involved will deploy another strategy, a a passive strategy. They will not act. The town should refer the case to the canton but they do nothing. The environmental protection organisations denounce the case in the report, but whilst they denounce the case to reporters, they will not go further. They do not mobilize their right of appeal. So these two actors remain passive, and on the ground, there is a position that allows Téléveysonnaz to create snow artificially before the date scheduled by the canton. So in this specific case, these activation strategies interact with each other. They fit within the configuration of a particular actor. Power relationships unfold between these actors which finally refine, adapt and may change over time and ultimately materialize within the arrangements between actors. These arrangements between actors are called Localized Regulation Arrangements, or LRA. There are two ways to read this: a political reading or a functional reading. Politically, these arrangements, the LRA, are the materialisation of the outcome of the actors’ game. They make these power relationship between actors tangible. In the case of Téléveysonnaz, the domination of Téléveysonnaz within the local power structure is made tangible. Secondly, they anchor the strategy that will be the strongest or who will emerge as winner of the game. As such they are discriminatory. They will privilege one player over another. Don’t think that because the actors are working together, they want to find a favourable solution for all. These arrangements are discriminatory in some cases. In the case of Veysonnaz, it can be clearly seen. Circumvention favours the actor most central to the configuration which is Téléveysonnaz. These arrangements, when an actor’s strategy materialises on the ground, create a relationship with the institutional regime. They work around it, diverting it, or innovating in relation to it. In a way, in a case of institutional innovation, they will improve the scope and consistency of the regime. Or in a case of circumvention or diversion, they will decrease it. From a functionality perspective, localized regulation arrangements encourage regulatory practices of the resource. How will management of the resource take place in a concrete case, a watershed, a ski station or as seen in the video, a water outlet. Rights and obligations are assigned. As such they will be discriminating. They will adjust ways of operating the resource. What is critical to the exploitation of the water resource is not the date provided in the institutional regime but rather the date at the start of October, when artificial snowmaking occurs, and eventually they will resolve these occasional rivalries. Let conclude by a simple overview of these localized regulatory arrangements. I will not go into details. We see that there are different forms. They are not limited to the implementation acts of public policies by state authorities. Rather, alongside the implementation acts, there are agreements negotiated between two actors. This may be written contracts, this may be oral agreements or in the case of Téléveysonnaz, a tacit demonstration of the arrangement. The actors never state that snow can be created before the date authorized by the canton, but by their lack of action they endorse this reality on the ground. Finally, it is the community arrangements that will united different users around a resource. These community arrangements represent a form of self-organization about the resource. They are common in Valais around irrigation systems. You have on the slide a more detailed classification of the various acts belonging to each of these categories. [MUSIC] [MUSIC] [MUSIC]
