[MUSIC] [MUSIC] Throughout the three previous sections, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, we have been able to build an analytical framework to open the black box of political processes between the institutional regime and its materialization in the field. Here is a representation. This framework is built around 4 major points. Let us summarise them. Firstly, the starting point of the analysis is a problem, a socially constructed and territorially anchored problem at the local level, as we have seen. Secondly, the institutional regime is no longer the starting point for the action of the actors, but rather its structural context, as we have seen. Thirdly, the metaphor for the game of actors, enabling the opening of the black box of social processes around the 3 variables: the configuration of actors, power relationships, and the law activation strategies, how actors use the rules to achieve their own objectives and to understand the results of these processes, the notion of localized regulation arrangements. As part of this section, I want to show you a concrete example to illustrate how this analytical framework is used in reality. This example is the case of the protection of aquatic ecosystems in the canton of Valais (Switzerland). It is a case that made a lot of noise in the newspapers throughout the year 2013. Here are two press clippings, with, on one side, the National Office for the Environment denouncing the slow pace at which cantons clean up their waterways, and on the other hand, the same position taken by ecological organisations who denounce the way that the canton of Valais cleans the rivers. Be aware that within water protection law, there was an obligation to implement water cleaning measures by late 2012, measures to ensure a certain flow in the rivers, so-called residual flow. The implementation of this law in the canton of Valais was particularly difficult. We will try to understand why using the analytical framework developed during the last three sections. Finally, there is a situation where there is a river, a tributary, of which there are many in Valais. There are a large number of uses of this river. The oldest uses are agricultural, withdrawals for irrigation water, which are relatively significant in the canton of Valais. Next, drinking water use developed, particularly in the case of tourist resorts where you have a high variability in demand and where there are networks that are sometimes oversized and a certain number of challenges linked to the supply of drinking water. Since the 1950s, we then see with the construction of a large number of dams on The first, of course, is the sanitation policy which is required by law the majority of tributaries in the canton of Valais. These three main types of uses, (there are others) create a problem, a risk to the aquatic ecosystem of the side rivers of the canton of Valais. This risk is recognised by actors. Some actors become mobilized, denouncing it. This is seen with ecological associations. And, finally, there is the construction of a problem at the local level that exists where risks to the ecosystem are present. The risk to the ecosystem, to explain it simply, is that there are too many withdrawals of water and that there is not enough water in the river to ensure conditions suitable to the aquatic ecosystem. That's the situation at the level of the construction of the problem. Institutional arrangements form around this problem, an institutional context, begins to form. We won’t be able to undertake an extensive analysis of this institutional regime but there are certain rules that are relevant to understand the action of the actors. The first, of course, is the sanitation policy which is required by law on the protection of water, from article 80 et seq. This policy states that the cantons (the confederation who delegates to the latter) is expected to undertake the task of cleaning the water, to put in place a number of measures to ensure that the aquatic ecosystem will be better protected. In parallel with this obligation of public policy, a number of rights guarantee the different users of the river and in particular for irrigation, called immemorial rights. They are centuries old, and allow users to continue with their uses. There is an uneasy coordination between these different elements. And a final rule that is very important - the right of appeal given to ecological associations. Very briefly put, there is an institutional context forming. The third point is to see how the game of actors plays out around this resource. We have a working group in the canton Valais which was set up at the administration level to implement this public policy. Put briefly, this public policy should have been implemented at the end of 2012, so all rivers should have been treated by the end of 2012. The current situation is that there is no water sanitation underway. So we have a very large gap. This discrepancy is explained by the dynamics of this working group. Three coalitions who clashed, somehow, or who interact with each. First, lets call the coalition the Environment coalition. It is represented by the environmental protection service of the canton of Valais and by the ecological associations. This coalition will want to concretise the rules which stem from the law on water protection, meaning, they want to put in place the ambitious sanitation measures set by the law. This is the first coalition. The second coalition is driven by the department responsible for energy issues in the canton of Valais: the Energy Coalition. It brings together the service and the different hydroelectric companies who have understood the need to implement public policy. However, they are looking to implement it with the least possible impact on the hydropower companies. This is called achieving a minimum: a number of measures are put in place but the situation on the ground does not really change as a result. And finally a third coalition, which is supported by the agriculture service and various agricultural users of the waterways. Ultimately, the agriculture service will attempt to bypass through confrontation. Everyone knows that the water taken for irrigation should also be subject to sanitation measures. The agriculture department will say no. That these samples are protected by immemorial rights and the sanitation measures should not be applied to these withdrawals. This is the configuration of actors with its three coalitions: the energy coalition, the agriculture coalition and the environment coalition. And finally, we have a power balance in the canton of Valais. A vision which is politically focused, which is pretty consistent with the strategy set by the office responsible for energy issues, and therefore by the energy coalition. There is certainly a desire to implement the law but minimally, whilst limiting losses for the hydropower industry. This balance of power, this interaction between the actors and the strategies explains the various arrangements which have been implemented on the ground. At the level of localized regulation arrangements, where a whole series of administrative activities have been deployed: a sanitation plan that was adopted in 2008, a series of intermediary decisions, feasibility studies to clean up the different rivers, and even final decisions which command hydroelectric concessionaries to implement certain measures. It is the first part of the localized regulation arrangements (LRA) Eventually, faced with final decisions deemed insufficiently ambitious, the environmental protection organisations became mobilized. They have made 11 objections and considering there were 12 final decisions, this was huge. There were two judgments rendered at the end of 2012 which clearly sanctioned the policy that was implemented in the Valais. It was explained that the measures do not go far enough in terms of the law on the protection of water. So we finally have an external authority, the district court, who reset the implementation of this policy in the canton of Valais. During that time, on the field, there was no change in the actors’ behaviour and no benefit for the aquatic ecosystem. This case ultimately shows the relevance of the proposed analytical framework. It shows how, firstly, internal contradictions in the administration can be an obstacle to the implementation of public policies. We have different services, pursuing a different yet legitimate public interest. Energy production, agriculture, environmental protection, and there are divisions between these different interests. There are conflicting relationships being established, an uneasy interaction between different actors, defending different interests. We'll have to arbitrate between these interests. Actors in the arbitration process are not passive subjects. On the contrary, they are stakeholders who seek to apply the law in the way that suits them best. It is clear that the water protection policy plays a pivotal role, but it is also clear that each actor will try to interpret it, to reinterpret it, in the way that is most consistent with their own interests. We see creative behaviour, even opportunistic behaviour, from these actors with minimal implementation strategies. They want to implement the law, but without any consequences on the ground, or by assuming a bypass strategy which is masked behind a divergent legal interpretation. Finally, it reveals the non-mechanical character, open, uncertain, of the process of the implementation of public policies, and processes through which the rules of the institutional regime, materialize on the ground. To understand the concrete methods behind the exploitation of water resources, it is not enough to look at what rules are approved within the institutional regime. We must also look at how the actors reappropriate these rules, and how the political processes, and the interactions between actors, materialize within localized regulation arrangements on the ground which determine the way that the resource is exploited. [MUSIC] [MUSIC] [MUSIC]
