The end of the Cold War created conditions for the beginning of the process of real reductions of nuclear forces. The first treaty was signed by the Soviet Union but the same year in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. And Russia, as successor of the Soviet Union, in the sphere of nuclear arms control was to implement that treaty. From the very beginning of the process of strategic arms reduction, this process was regarded as a long term project. Both sides decided to start the START process and then to continue it until they will reach a minimum level of nuclear armaments, minimum which allowed us still to ensure strategic stability. So, they decided to preserve the basic principle of future arms reduction - The principle of strategic stability. And this principle was based on another principle, which was very important for Russia, is the principle of parity in nuclear capabilities with the United States. The treaty on strategic arms reductions, signed in 1991, for the first time, envisaged these dramatic reductions of nuclear forces of both sides. The system of limitations was also very complex, depending on the weapon which one side or another regarded as the most destabilizing. Let's see how the system was organized. The system of limitations established by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I, was even more complicated than in strategic arms limitations treaty. These time, not just launching systems, but also warheads were limited. So, the system can be presented as two circles. This is the limitations on launchers; no more than 1,600 of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. But inside that's general limitations, there were other; no more than 154 heavy ICBMs. That was the maximum number of allowed launches. Speaking about warheads, no more than 6,000 warheads in general and no more than 4,900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Inside that limitation, there were other limitations; no more than 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs and no more than 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs. This set of limitations was regarded as a really stabilising structure. The limitations established by START I meant that both sides were to reduce their nuclear forces, approximately by 30 percent. There was another set of limitations or even prohibitions. A ban on several types of nuclear weapons was established. First of all, it was prohibited to develop new intercontinental ballistic missiles, which were regarded as heavy missiles. So, no more heavy missiles. It was also prohibited to deploy heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles on mobile platforms. Heavy SLBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles, were prohibited too. It was also prohibited to develop and deploy air launched ballistic missiles. And there were several other prohibitions which were included into this set of limitations inside the treaty. There were several new elements, comparatively new elements, in the treaty. For the first time, both sides agreed to limit not only launchers, but also warheads. This is why it was so important to include into the treaty and to the set of agreements, a very complicated system of counting rules was necessary to understand how warheads have to be calculated. Limitations were established only on deployed launchers and warheads on deployed launchers, because according to the treaty, both sides needed to destroy some of their weapons, specific set of liquidations of weapons, procedures were also established. There were some traditional parts and this treaty also. For example, a list of definitions was extended and was really important part of this treaty. According to the treaty, the system of verification and monitoring was established. It was very complex and detailed system. That type of system never existed before and even after expiration of the treaty, nothing similar was developed. There were several types of inspections, permanent monitoring system on production facilities, and data exchange, exchange of various information between sites. The treaty was signed in the periods of serious changes. The situation in the early 90s was truly controversial. The leadership of Russia still believed that it is possible to establish a new system of interaction with the United States. The idea of a global strategic partnership was widespread among Russian political elite. In this situation, it seemed that mutual deterrence is not so relevant anymore and it's not necessary to take care about strategic stability and parity in nuclear weapons with the United States. For example, on January 27, 1992, the first Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, sent a message to the UN secretary general, "highlighting Russia's goal, I quote, to make its weighty contribution to the creation of a single global space of cooperation and security." This letter said also, "We are no longer adversaries of the United States and the other NATO countries and we consider as obsolete a situation in which we aim our nuclear sights at each other. We must by joint efforts decisively deliver ourselves from this legacy of the period of confrontation and the 'cold war.'" Yet, the general crisis, systematic crisis, that engulfed Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, of course inevitably, affected the state of Russian military forces and nuclear forces particularly. On the graph, you can see how dramatically Russia decreased its military spendings in the first half of 1990s and the capabilities of Russian military forces were decreasing even faster, and even faster than Russian economy. In light of these contexts, the Russian military and certain members of Russian political elite thought that Russian sovereignty, Russia's ability to influence the development of the New World Order are closely linked with Russian status as nuclear superpower. It was the main reason why you're in this transitional period. Russian's strategists and politicians preferred to adopt existing strategy and existing forces to the new conditions, rather than reformulate nuclear strategy in the basic concepts underlying Russia's nuclear strategy. In these conditions, it was quite difficult to continue Russo-American negotiations in the sphere of Nuclear Arms Control because of severe contradictions inside Russian expert community in political circles.
