How can we explain kindness and cruelty? Where does our sense of right and wrong come from? Why do people so often disagree about moral issues? This course explores the psychological foundations of our moral lives.
Week 5 Office Hours Part (2014)
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Moralities of Everyday Life
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Family, Friends, and Strangers
Our moral feelings are usually most powerful towards our kin (such as our parents and our children) and our friends and allies. We will discuss these special bonds, and then turn to the morality of racial and ethnic bias. Then we use the tools of behavioral economics to explore the controversial question of whether we are ever truly altruistic to strangers.
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Paul BloomBrooks and Suzanne Ragen Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Yale University
Psychology
[BLANK_AUDIO]
Hi.
Welcome to our fifth installment of Office Hours.
I'm not going to introduce us this time, because if you don't
know who we are, this is really strange that you're watching this.
so, we're excited about this, we have a lot of, a lot of great questions.
I want to make a couple of announcements to start with.
First many of you have requested a reading list.
Based on when I taught this as a full course a while ago.
And, and I'm in the process of preparing one, so that'll
be posted, tomorrow or the day after, pretty soon.
Second some of you have asked about, the name of the course,
Moralities of Everyday Life, and different speculations of where it came from.
And I actually should have mentioned this before, but it's, it's
not my name, it was taken from a book Sabini and Silver.
Two great social psychologists, called Moralities of Everyday Life.
And although
the topics of the book were a little
bit different than what we're doing, so I never
used the book, the title always stuck with me, so I decided to borrow it for this.
finally, I've been on the discussion boards a lot.
And been reading with tremendous interest in the discussion and the debates.
Some of the discussion pertains not just to the topics but to the course itself.
And so I should say a couple of things.
One thing is I very much appreciate the critical
comments we've been getting on how to improve it.
Other readings to add.
Other methods of evaluation.
There's a good chance I'll teach it again, and
when I do so I'll take these into account.
In fact, what I'm going to do is I'm going to open up a thread where
people can make comments and suggestions on how to do it differently next time.
And also I've been reading a lot of really kind words about my teaching.
About about Christina,
about the, the team creating us, about
the course itself and we're all tremendously grateful.
And I, and I don't respond because it seems
kind of weird to say, oh, thank you, I'm very touched.
To a lot of different emails, through all of these messages, but I really am.
So I wanted to, to say that. Okay, let's get started.
>> Okay, great.
So we have a great list of questions this week.
[CROSSTALK]
>> I want to answer really fast, it's kind of like a lightning round.
>> [LAUGH] Okay, so the first question comes from
Linn Zyoki, and apologies for mispronouncing
your name, because I'm sure I did,
But this question is about, different
kinds of moral foundations we've talked about.
So there's harm and fairness, but there are also
foundations like loyalty and authority and things like that.
And this question is about, if we sort of
don't see, if we try not to treat groups differently
from each other, if we think all of these groups are the same,
then should we sort of not care about these things like loyalty or betrayal?
Treason and so on.
>> It's interesing.
I think they're, I think to some extent, if you didn't have any groups at all.
And you didn't break the world into categories.
A whole lot of moral notions would go away.
There'd be no such thing as patriotism,
or loyalty to your country. Or a feeling of being trade by your group.
Or, or feeling of solidarity.
On the other hand, you can feel these emotions to specific people.
So, and so, even if there were no groups around and I didn't break
the world up into groups, I could feel loyalty to my to my parents.
I could feel betrayed by my spouse.
And so these emotions could
work even if we see a world of
individuals, and we don't categorize them into groups.
>> Okay.
I mean, you might think of a family as being a group.
>> It's true.
So, so, there's two ways of capturing it, which I
think are, are, look the same but are psychologically different.
One is I treat my family as a group. So I'm loyal to my family.
Another one is I think of my son, my other son, and my wife.
And there is, there, whom my loyalty
is tied to, but there is no category associated with it.
And in some way when I think about a cat, family with
just 3 people, it sort of comes down to the same thing.
But when I think of, but, but this would
mean if your loyalty to just individuals for instance.
You couldn't have connections to a thousand people, and a thousand people.
So essentially your following is really small.
>> So speaking to family, and
our loyalty to family.
A question from Stewart Chesner who brings up the video clip
we watched of the guy and the patient in the show House.
Who was wanting to give away all of his organs
so he could save the lives of a number of people.
And so the clips are illustrated well, the show I guess interpreted his behavior as
being crazy. But Stewart points out what about someone
maybe analogous like a marine, or an officer, who sacrifices himself in war.
And he's given a medal of honor and the guy in-house is treated as crazy.
So what's the difference between these types of cases?
>> Yes, it's an interesting question.
There's at least two types of differences. One difference.
Maybe the less important one, is the difference between a pre-planned
action versus versus something you do instinctively, or on the spot.
We tend to sort of, people just think
quickly, and rapidly in a time of emergency.
We could often, we, we treat it different.
So, so, it's, so a soldier who throws himself on a grenade or someone who
darts into traffic to rescue a child is about to be hit by a truck.
We view that one way as opposed to a soldier who decides well,
weeks in advance to do a suicide mission. Or somebody who plans to rescue a child.
Even though he'll know.
He knows that he'll die. So that's one difference.
I think the real difference though is that the
character in House was giving up his life for strangers.
And that strikes us a weird.
It strikes us as, as insane.
It's not how people work.
so, if I told you I was going to give my kidney to a stranger,
you'd be, you'd be stunned. Not many people do that.
Some do, not many.
And if I told you that I was going to give each
of my kidneys to a different stranger, you'd say that's crazy.
I would die, or.
And, but if I told you I was going to give a kidney to save the life of my child.
You'd say, well sure, you know.
You'd be wrong not to.
If I had two children who were dying and I said
I'm going to sacrifice my life to save them, it's a harder case,
but that'd be more understandable.
So, the issue what made the guy on House crazy
is, he was giving away his life for a stranger.
Now, House always deals with great philosophical questions.
And, and you could say, well, the moral of this is utilitarianism is crazy.
So utilitarianism is the idea that you should act
so as to maximize the happiness of many people.
You have perfectly healthy person, he goes in a hospital and he says; I could
save 7 people by giving my heart to one, my kidneys to another and so on.
Isn't that better?
And we say no, no, that's ridiculous, and we view it as crazy.
We accept, at least as people, maybe not always as
moral philosophers, that you should value your own life more
than the lives of strangers just as you value the
life of your friends and your children more than strangers.
>> Okay, so the next question from Beorn Hollison returns to
the issue of the different foundations,
the different moral foundations we've discussed.
And we've talked a lot about differences between conservative,
conservatives and liberals, and sort of valuing different foundations more.
And Bjorn asks what about
are, are there instances in which the liberal position could be characterized as
being driven more by purity, for example, with being anti-genetically modified food?
Or nuclear power.
And so on.
>> Yeah I think that's a good point, Appiah actually
we saw a video by Appiah as an optional video.
Appiah makes a point in this great book, Experiments in Ethics,
he says, We're tempted to think that conservatives
are purity obsessed, and liberals don't care about it.
But a better way of looking at it
is Conservatives tend to worry more about purity in
the domain of sex, and the Liberals tend to
worry more about purity in the domain of food.
And and so, responses to genetically modified
organisms importance of natural foods, being a vegetarian,
being a vegan. Can all be understood as purity.
Now some Liberals will balk at this, they'll
say this is entirely rash, this is entirely utilitarian.
I am a vegetarian, because it's healthier, I do not want the animals to suffer.
I am against genetically modified organisms, I believe they're dangerous.
And so on, but and, and that may be true just like
Conservatives could say, I'm not really obsessed about purity and sex, I'm worried
about people's conduct, and safety, and self respect and so on.
Nobody likes to admit they're caught up in purity, but I
think the Conservatives are and I think the Liberals are too.
I think one could see this in a certain obsession with the natural.
So so a lot of things that are natural are actually not very good for you.
And a lot of things that are artificial are very good for you.
But there's a drive, there's a, there's a implicit belief that natural, is valuable
is better. One case study is bottled water.
Which is, which is you know, bad for the environment, no healthier
than tap water in most places, less in some places, and indistinguishable.
In flavor, typically, from tap water.
But it's pure.
And the purity has an appeal, and I think the
appeal is more towards liberal side, than the conservative side.
>> Okay.
So, relatedly, a question from Berthalicia Navarro.
She asks what we've talked a lot about, liberals and
conservatives, but is there place in any of this for Libertarians?
There's not been an as much research on libertarians,
but there's a recent paper by John Haidt's colleagues.
I don't think Haidt is the first author but if you go
into his webpage you could see it and and they study libertarians.
They do a big study on liberty.
And looking from John Haidt's theory of these different moral foundations.
And libertarians are what you'd expect. Which is more so than conservatives.
But also more so than classic liberals.
They prioritize harm as an
important moral component. And they diminish everything else.
So even liberals are often squeamish about drug use and prostitution,
child labor all sorts of things.
and, and, and Libertarians say, look if those things cause harm an
indirect way then they're wrong but
no other consideration should, should, should matter.
So, you could view Libertarians as a
privileging of one moral dimension over all others.
>> Cool, alright so another question from Haymond Zarzav.
Who asks about so we've had, we've talked about some experiments
that have maybe been ethically questionable,
that maybe wouldn't be done today.
For example the Milgram Experiment caused a lot of people to distress.
And he points out, or she Payment?
[LAUGH] Points that there are T.V. show that do kind of experiments like this.
Where they do either replicate these old experiments or
sort of invent new ones of their own. And cause people a lot of distress.
So what are your thoughts on these?
Are, should we see them as legitimate experiments and, you know, should
they be bound by some sort of ethical code as we are?
>> Yeah it's, it's, it's I've seen some of these shows.
And some of them do pretty awful things
to people, some very deceptive things to people.
And then there's also shows that, you know, play tricks on people.
Just you know, the original is Candid Camera where
everyday people would do ludicrous things and so on.
And, and it, it's just for laughs.
And we have a moral code we have a
legal code and a moral code, institutional code for experiments.
And what it is to be an experiment fits certain criteria, you have
to do with an eye towards you know, accumulating scientific data and so on.
And so if I'm going to do an experiment,
I have to get permission from my review board at Yale.
And it's a complicated process, and there's all sorts of checks and balances.
But if I want to do something for fun.
I don't have to worry about that, I have to worry about the law.
I can't kill people for fun.
But if you know, If I'm going to do an experiment by telling people that
something is delicious by putting hot pepper in it, to see how they respond.
I'd have to get, it would take like a year to
get it through and I would never get permission for it.
But if I want to do it as a joke to
my friends, there's nothing Stopping me, and so so there's different strictures.
And so, my sense is that this stuff done on TV is not research in any sense.
It's not experimental research.
It's demonstrations.
And as such, it doesn't fall under
the rubric of the restrictions under Experimental work.
It falls just under law. >> Okay,
okay.
So, question from Yolanda Blanch, about the
ultimatum game, we've talked about, a few times.
And we often talk about it in a sense of you know, I
have 10 dollars and I can offer you some amount of the 10 dollars.
>> Yeah.
>> And then you can refuse or accept the offer.
But Yolanda's wondering well, what if the, the
money is really huge amount, will the results
come out the same way? >> Hm, so you, yeah, yeah.
So the ultimatum game, ultimatum game as a reminder is a game where I offer you,
I get 10 dollars say, and I get to offer you as much money as I want.
I get from from 1 dollar to 10 dollars.
You, had just one option you could accept it and we each walk away.
I walk away with my remaining money and you walk away
with your money, or you could reject it and nobody gets anything.
And the big
finding is that people aren't entirely rational on the sense,
so purely rational mean in a sense, it gets complicated.
We' just take whatever money, because, rejecting it doesn't do anything for
you, and if we're strangers, we're not going to play it again.
But of course, people don't do that.
People, if it's too low, they reject it out of spite.
So psychologists do these experiments, and psychologists are poor
so they do it for small sums of money.
They do it, and they then do it online for like 50 cents.
Ten cents, twenty cents, thirty cents, forty, sometimes
they don't even do that, sometimes they give
their subjects a piece of paper and say,
so what would you do if, something like that?
And then economists come in, though, economists believe you should do real
money, and they have more money, so, so they really give people money.
And the intuition, is, is, correct which is the amount of money
has some effect on it, and I'm not sure it's been studied systematically.
But crudely if it's common sense, which is the more money
you get, the less likely you're to reject it out of spite.
So we're playing a game and you have 10 dollars, you hand me 1.
I say oh puh, I reject it, we both suffer, s, so there.
But if you had you know 10,000 dollar bills And you
handed me 1000 dollar bill and said take it or leave it.
I think I'm going to walk away with that, I might be annoyed, but there the spite
is counteracted by, you know, what you get if you don't express your spite.
>> You get $1000.
Exactly, and, and, and it captures something
which we've been talking about throughout the course.
Which is there's a tension between often between your intuition
with the right thing to do and other, other considerations.
So the right thing to do, you've insulted me.
Justice is restored if I say, hah, we get nothing.
But it's a thousand dollars.
And that's you know, and that would make a difference.
>> That might be worth it.
Okay so moving on to talk about babies a little bit.
Craig Ray Dean asks, we've talked about research showing that
babies show a preference for faces of their own race.
And then ask well what, what faces would babies who are mixed race have?
>> So, so it's
interesting babies do prefer to look at their own race.
But what's interesting is, it's not exactly because it's their own race.
So unlikely that know what race they are.
So, a better way of putting it is, these studies which find
that white babies look at white people, black people look at black people.
It's because white are surrounded by white people.
Black babies surrounded by black people.
They're not responding to their own race
per say, but, to who they're familiar with.
So how do we know that's true.
Well, the, the, the, the, the question has actually been directly explored.
In tests, in one study they tested, not mixed race kids,
but they tested Ethiopian babies who were, being raised in Israel.
And so these babies actually were surrounded
by both black people and white people.
They showed no preference at all, compared to say black baby surrounded
by black people, white baby by white people.
Then you get a preference, so the answer to the question needs to
be the range of people you're, you, you see in your everyday life.
If you only see people look one way, you'll like that one way.
If you see a range of people, you won't have a preference
>> Okay.
And so that suggests, and I think has been tested, that if you're a white
baby growing up surrounded all by black people,
you have a preference for black faces, not
white. >> That would be exactly right.
And actually, it's interesting.
I don't know when kids know what color they are.
I don't even know exactly, when kids know
what gender they are, or what sex they are.
So we know that most, that most people, most
kids prefer females to males, but kids who are raised
by a male, gradually come to prefer males to females.
But do they know themselves what they are.
Well at some point they do, but not from the get-go.
And it's an interesting question when it emerges.
>> Right.
Okay and I guess related to expanding subject pools into sort of more varied.
>> Mm-hm.
>> More diverse populations. Robert Veitch asks about so we've
talked about that people in a lot of psychology studies are weird.
>> Yeah.
>> They're from Western educated populations.
And the babies and baby studies are often the children of these weird people.
>> Yeah.
>> And so, this is obviously not representative of humanity as a whole.
>> Yep.
>> Is there, sort of some movement
within psychology to move towards more diverse populations?
>> There is. In some way, the movements comes
from a couple of directions.
There's more and more people studying people, studying hunter gatherer
groups, and studying groups isolated from the rest of the world.
And these are some of the most non-weird people you can look at.
So Joseph Henrich is doing some great work on that.
But also getting more and more samples so there's a lot of studies
now being done on the internet, using using internet sampling and so on.
Now, obviously a study done on the
internet is going to capture only the proportion
of the population that has access to a computer, that's literate and so on.
So you, so it's fairly narrow, population.
But in another sense, it's very broad.
You're no longer just testing, you know, US, and Europe, and Canada.
But now, you have the whole world.
You have, you know, India, and China, and Africa.
And you get a much broader perspective on humanity.
I also like to think that some projects
like the baby research I've been involved in.
A lot of these kids are in some sense weird kids.
They themselves, I don't think are,
are western educated, industrial, rich or democratic.
They're they're just babies.
And, and I, and I think for the most part when
testing young enough babies, a baby is a baby, is a baby.
And so, and so I think that, that's another way
of getting away from the sort of narrow focus of psychologists.
>> Great.
And sticking with the baby work for a while.
We have a question from Moira Merryweather, who
asks about the baby studies that you've talked about.
Where babies show a preference for, a particular, a person who helped
another person, so on, we're sort of coaching this as a moral preference.
So she's wondering why do you see this
as a moral choice, rather than just a preference.
>> You
know what's weird, I am now starting to recognize these names, I've
spent enough time in discussion for you to have me go, hi Mora!
Hi Robert Veich, I guess I know these people.
Anyway.
it's, it's a good question.
I mean, I, I've done this research and it's a question we struggle with.
So at some sense you might say we don't
know if it's a moral preference, all we know
and I think this would be interesting, is that
it's a preference that sort of resonates to the, kindness
or cruelty of somebody.
Whether are helping or hurting, or, or hitting or, or,
or stroking or whatever Positive or negative, it resonates to that.
But is the preference itself moral, or is it like survival or something like that?
And we tried to look at this.
I think the set of experiments that are most relevant here look at punishment.
So what we find is that babies will punish
the bad guy, and they'll approve of other individuals
who punish the bad guy.
And I think this is interesting in a couple ways.
First thing.
It's not, it shows that whatever we find can't just
be the babies are approaching the one that seems safer.
Because in order to punish they approach the one that's the worst one.
And I think it's also that punishment is
to some extent, a signature property of morality.
Which is so, you know, if, if, if you know, I don't eat raisins,
so if you eat raisins I might disagree with that.
But I don't think you should be punished
for that, it's just a difference in preference.
But if I hear you, you know, kill babies, something that's
very bad, and I think you should be punished for it.
And I would approve of somebody who punishes you for it.
So finding, punishment in babies might be sort of
a signature queue that we're dealing with moral domain here.
>> Great.
Okay so the next question is from Marta Olasick, and
basically she is a bit upset at the way we've talked about stereotypes.
And sort of worried about the consequences of people having stereotypes, and just
wondered if you could spend a little bit more time talking about it.
>> Yeah, I read her comment a while ago with some interest.
And I'm not surprised this has come up. I,
I gave a lecture dealing with issues, of race and bias and stereotypes,
and I said, stereotyping is not inherently wrong.
Stereotyping is a natural psychological process.
For the most part, it's accurate. And for the most part, it's useful.
If I'm walking through a dark street at
night, I'm going to be a little bit more worried
if I see am an at the corner than if I see a woman at the corner.
Because my stereotype of a man is, they're more prone to violent crime, than women.
This is correct and it's useful.
And if I'm asking for directions, I want to ask somebody who's walking by in a suit
rather than somebody who's sort of gibbering hopelessly in
a corner disheveled and looking insane because of my stereotypes.
Now, I can be wrong.
So part of having these stereotypes
the most, these are statistical generalizations.
If I thought that all men are
violent criminals and no women are violent criminals.
If I thought that everybody in the suit is helpful,
and every person who looks disheveled and confused is unhelpful.
I'd just be confused and I make mistakes all the time.
But I don't think that.
I think these are generalizations, and
these generalizations, I will argue, are natural.
Again, they're natural.
Their useful their rational. And then there's caveats.
And so, so one caveat is that we're sometimes wrong.
So one example I give and this is from Lee Jussim's work is, we actually are very
good at gender stereotypes and ethnicity stereotypes.
We are not good at political stereotypes.
Liberals have weird stereotypes of conservatives.
Conservatives have weird stereotypes of liberals.
Its not hard to see where they go awry.
When you have opposing groups, you tend to demonize the other group.
You start think they are stupid.
They are evil, they're crazy, extreme.
And you tend to get things incredibly wrong.
But so, so I'm even ster, so stereotyping is not, is
not perfect, and then there's also to that consequences from stereotypes.
They can be used to to motivate racist actions and so on.
But the stereotypes themselves I think are relatively
innocent, and I think they're here to stay.
That, that as long as there's differences
in human groups I'm going to record them in,
in my head.
And, and, and as long as the differences
are real and my recording of them is accurate,
and as long as I treat them as
statistical generalizations not as absolutes they're going to be useful.
One of the things came up in a discussion board is
whether as say Muslims or Orthodox Jews is they don't eat pork.
I understand its not always true. But its mostly true.
Its a good statistic.
Its a good statistic if someone is over at your house, what do you offer them to eat.
It sounds like a small thing.
But I always think that someone who walks
through the world without stereotypes would be totally lost.
And would not actually be able to a moral and effective person.
>> It sounds like a lot of the work there is being done with the key thing,
that you mentioned about using them as generalizations and
not as a, not assuming that with every person
this is a, an absolute fact.
>> That's right and there, there's a sort of stereotype about stereotypes.
Which is what people say is, oh people, you know,
everybody has these stupid stereotypes where they think that all
of this ethnic group is stupid, and all of this
ethnic group is evil, and all of this and so on.
But you actually study people and people are a lot smarter than that.
So people say, you know yeah.
You know, some ethnic
groups, like in America like Jews and Asians are more
likely to end up in college that the average population.
But I don't think all Jews and Asians are, are, are smart.
I think some are going to, you know, be
criminals, some aren't going to college, some are.
And people are in but, negative stereotypes.
They, they say some groups are more likely to end up in prison, end up in trouble.
I don't think everybody.
And you could believe, you could hold these stereotypes
without thinking that, that these are facts that are,
facts of the universe that are unchangeable, they're, they're,
maybe that they're due to God's will or genetics.
Some people believe that, but that's not a part of a stereotype.
The stereotype is a statistical observation, and so,
so, if people really did have beliefs like wverybody
in group X has this property, then they'd
be so mistaken and will cause so much trouble.
But we don't, we're pretty good at this. >> Okay,
lastly a couple of questions more broadly about the course itself.
>> Mm-hm.
>> So we have a, a few people have asked
this they want to know if we're gathering any data
or information In the responses to for example, the in
video quiz questions or other sorts of forum questions we post.
Are we, are we sort of using this for some nefarious background experiment?
>> We are not, with one exception.
We're, we're currently working
together on the, on the third, I'm sorry, on the final exam.
And the final exam will end with two questions that are not questions to be
evaluated, but questions designed to tap people's
beliefs about what they've learned in the course.
And that I am very curious about what the answers are.
And so so that's our only, that's our only data mining.
Everything else we're not going to use the data.
They're meant.
The open ended questions are meant for prompts.
But they're not going to be recorded or stored.
>> Alright.
Alright so look forward to week six quiz.
And lastly there's a, a course by Peter Singer coming
out in a Coursera that starts in I think March
first called Prac, Practical Ethics and somebody was wondering do
you recommend this as a good follow up to this course?
>> Yeah so obviously the course hasn't come
out yet it might be terrible, I don't know.
But I've signed up for it and and so, and knowing Peter Singer's
not going to be terrible.
He's a very, very smart philosopher and a gifted
teacher so I think it's going to be terrific.
It's going to be, you know, more, much, apparently much more
philosophy than my course which deals with a lot of psychology.
It may well deal with Peter Singer, defending and articulating his
views and, and making a case for them and, but I think it's going to be fascinating.
There's other sort of courses I want to, I'd, I'd recommend.
One course which I think some people on discussion boards has mentioned is
one which is already been out for a while by Michael Sandel, Unjustice.
It's a lovely Course.
And it's beautifully presented. It's very interesting.
It goes over the major philosophers.
It's a very different format. It's pure.
It's, it's, it's, there's not interaction.
It's pure lecture. But it's, it's a wonderful course.
There's also some wonderful courses by my Yale colleagues.
Tamar Gendler has a course which we, I, on Open Yale, which we've already, assign
part of Shelly Kagan, a philosopher here, has a course on death which is wonderful.
And I will also mention that Robert Wright, whose TED talk we will have seen,
is also offering a course on Buddhism and I think Buddhism and psychology.
Which I've also signed
up for.
And I think he'll connect to some moral issues, but
even if he doesn't, it's going to be very interesting.
What I'll conclude on is that, that I feel I should just let
people know this, that this summer coming up I'll be offering a class on
moralities of everyday life. But it will be somewhat different.
It'll be one which will be a full worth of a semester course.
And and I will be interacting with the students one on one.
It will be a lot more readings.
A lot more writing assignments.
And so a sort of a supercharged version of this course.
This course, if you take it, is, is available for college credit.
And it's only available for students
in college or above.
It's not available for high school students.
It counts as a Yale course.
They're asking a lot of money for it but but we've always had a lot of fun with it.
And I feel for those people who are interested in
a much more immersive experience you might be interested in this.
And when I send out the announcement for next week where I have
the quiz and the readings and everything,
I'll include information about the course and
how to get more information about it. >> Okay.
>> Thank you.
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