7.4 The Palestinian Struggle from Jordan

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Do curso por Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

253 classificações

Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

253 classificações

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome) Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

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WEEK 3

The escalation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1973

7.1.1 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 110:00

7.1.2 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 25:41

7.1.3 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 37:03

7.2.1 The Revival of the Palestinian Identity - Part 18:14

7.2.2 The Revival of the Palestinian Identity - Part 27:33

7.3.1 The Deterioration to War in 1967 - Part 18:38

7.3.2 The Deterioration to War in 1967 - Part 24:40

7.3.3 The Deterioration to War in 1967 - Part 39:59

7.4 The Palestinian Struggle from Jordan6:16

7.5 Black September8:10

7.6 The War of Attrition, 1968-707:31

Conheça os instrutores

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

Now after 1967, after the loss of the West Bank, the

Palestinians continued their arms-struggle against Israel from Jordan,

but now from Jordan of the East Bank, Jordan on the other side of the river.

And the question is, why do the Jordanians accept this?

After the June war of 1967 the Jordanians

were weak and struggling to recover from their defeat.

And Hussein was also very reluctant to fight the Palestinians.

After all, if Hussein sought to represent the

Palestinians in a negotiation with Israel over the West

Bank, he could hardly go about doing so

by fighting the Palestinians and their deployment in Jordan.

This deployment in Jordan gradually became a kind of state-within-a-state.

And it is interesting to follow how this came about.

After the June war, Fatah and similar organizations

try to take root in the West Bank

and to conduct a gorilla war against Israel

from the occupied territories in the West Bank.

But the Israeli security services were too efficient.

And Fatah had to move out of the West Bank very quickly and

take up deployment on the other side of the river, on the East Bank.

And it is from the East Bank of Jordan that Fatah

and other Palestinian organizations continued

to wage their struggle against Israel.

And the struggle against Israel naturally drew an Israeli retaliation.

A major operation was conducted by the Israelis in March, 1968.

On the village of Karameh on the southern Jordan valley

where Fatah had established a base of operations, and the Karameh

Operation became a great symbol in Palestinian historiography of

armed struggle of the Palestinians which ended in great victory against Israel.

What actually happened in Karameh?

In Karameh there was a huge confrontation between Israeli

forces that had entered Jordanian territory, and Jordanian forces.

And it was actually Jordanian artillery which had inflicted most

of the losses on the Israeli forces that moved into Jordan.

But in the Palestinian narrative the Jordanians are completely left out.

And the Israeli difficulties in Karameh, an operation which

ended only with relative success and many Israeli casualties.

Described by the Palestinians as an Israeli defeat

inflicted on the Israelis by the Palestinian fighters themselves.

Karameh was therefore presented as a great Palestinian victory.

And not only the victory of the Palestinians, but

the victory of their concept of popular armed struggle.

That is, the Palestinian popular armed struggle could defeat the Israeli

in a way that the Arab regular armies could not do.

And though the Arab regular armies were defeated by

Israel in 1967, just a few months before, here

the Palestinians were able to achieve victory, just like

the Algerians had done against the French in Algeria.

Or how the Viet Cong was doing against the United States in Vietnam.

And as a result of the, the symbolic value of the Karameh battle even though

militarily it had been far less successful than the Palestinians portrayed it.

It paved the way for the volunteering of many, many thousands of

young Palestinian men in Jordan to join the Palestinian fighting organizations.

It also paved the way for the takeover of the PLO by the

Palestinian fighting organizations.

And in the years of 1968 and 1969, the takeover of

the PLO by Fatah and the other Palestinian fighting organizations was completed.

And the PLO was converted from a bureaucratic organization as it

had been under Shukhairy into an

umbrella organization of Palestinian armed organizations.

And since Fatah was the largest organization within the PLO, Yasser

Arafat, the leader of Fatah, now also became the chairman of the PLO.

But after Karameh, the Israelis continued to

fight against the Palestinian presence in the

Jordan Valley, and the Palestinian forces were

forced to move inwards into deeper Jordanian territory.

The Jordan Valley where the Palestinians had

concentrated was pulverized by Israeli military action.

And this forced the Palestinian forces to move

further into Jordan and essentially to take over Palestinian

refugee camps in the main cities of Jordan, particularly

in Amman, creating the erosion of the Jordanian state.

And the creation of entire territories

within Jordan, completely controlled by Palestinian organization

that became extra territorial entities into

which even King Hussein was not admitted.

In the summer of 1970 the United States made an initiative to launch

the peace process between Israel and the Arab states based on Resolution 242.

This was known as The Rogers Initiative named

after the US Secretary of State at the time.

[BLANK_AUDIO]

A US initiative based on resolution 242, that

is that resolution which did not include the Palestinians.

Was it an initiative that meant an

Israeli, Jordanian negotiation over the future of

the West Bank and the parallel negotiation

between Egypt and Israel over the Egyptian territories.

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