Welcome everyone. we have a real treat today. a, our, our guest a friend of mine and and somebody who's really on the inside of the government and all the way from the early days of 9/11. Juan Zarate to do his Google Hangout with us. Juan thank you so much for being with us. >> David, thanks for having me. It's great to be with you. >> So Juan was a, a prosecutor in the Main Justice Department prior to 9/11 in August of 2001. he moved over to the Treasury Department, he'll tell you a little bit about what he was doing, and then in the second Bush administration he became one of the key White House counter terrorism advisers. So we'll post his full bio for all students to see but you can see he's really got a depth of experience. and, and we're very, very fortunate that he could spare the time to, to be with us today. so Juan, if, if I could start maybe it'd be best to kind of tell, tell the everyone a little bit about what you were doing when you came over to treasury and what your perspective was in the in the weeks leading up to leading up to 9/11. Well thank you David its great to be with everybody I was very fortunate, I was a young prosecutor, I joined main justice which was then called the terrorist and violent crime section to look at and prosecute and investigate terrorism cases international terrorism cases. I was super lucky in that I was able to Join the team that was looking at the embassy bombings case to help prosecute that. That was being prosecuted out of New York, but I was sort of, added to the team to, to help at a very junior level in 1999. So from a very early stage of my professional career I was looking at Al-Qaeda attacks, the use of. Prosecutions to, to look at gathering intelligence and information on Al Qaeda but more importantly as my career at the Justice Department progressed later working on the USS Cole investigation, that was the attack in October 2000 on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen really got a glimpse of a group that was growing in significance. growing in it's capabilities, and certainly more and more brazen in its attacks on the U.S. and I remember a number of us internally who were looking at these cases being very, sort of, open with each other about, sort of, the growing crescendo of threats and growing crescendo of attacks that we had seen. And literally talking about the fact that this group was at war with us and we were in some ways not, sort of, being as responsive as we, as we could be and certainly it felt from little bit defensive about where we stood. as you mentioned, David, in August of 2001, I was asked to join the Treasury Department. I did that. That was a little bit of an odd move, move because I was a prosecutor looking at these terrorism cases. Didn't quite know what the Treasury did but I was asked to come on board to look at. the international enforcement issues and to help the leadership at the Treasury to look at things like money laundering, sanctions international organized crime from a money perspective. From the perspective of illicit finance and to see what we could do from an enforcement vantage point. and so that's what I went over in late August 2001 to do. two and a half weeks later we had nine eleven, and I was on the fourth floor of the Treasury Department looking south over the Potomac watching the black smoke billow from the Pentagon when that happened. and then we evacuated the Treasury Department, and you know, the, our world was never the same again, and certainly the Treasury Department was never the same again. Because we went into full mode to look at how we could use Treasury tools and powers to undercut the ability of Al Qaeda to plot other attacks, and to expand its reach. >> [INAUDIBLE]. >> And so I was very fortunate to be in some places where I could at least try to have an impact on, on our policy. >> well, let's just look at the, even at those earliest days you know, the 9/11 Commission Report, one of the titles of its chapter is the, the light was blinking red. if being in, you know, even for a short couple of weeks in a position where you were maybe seeing intelligence and things like that. Was that the sense when you got to Treasury, that the light was blinking red? That there was a, an idea that an attack might be imminent, and there was a frantic search for, for clues at that point? >> I think there was a sense in the counter-terrorism community and certainly those of us who, prior 9/11, have been looking at Al Qaeda a bit. Al Qaeda was growing in its power and in its desire to hit the United States in a more dramatic and significant ways. Keep in mind Al Qaeda has in mind a strategy of forcing the United States to alter its policy in the Middle East and North Africa very much trying to alter our strategy long-term. And so there was a very clear sense, at least those of us who were watching this, that there was something building. now I don't want to pretend that I was in the inner sanctum seeing the Presidential daily briefs or anything like that, which I wasn't. so I, I didn't see some of the reports that later came out under the nine eleven commission report and investigation. but certainly, prior to nine eleven and in those summer days, I think there was a sense of that Al Qaeda was, was still looming and that there was a threat present. at Treasury, I don't think we were yet focused on exactly how that was going to manifest itself but. that certainly became a focus after nine 11. >> So then the attacks take pace and, of course, as I told you students are are thinking this week about, you know, what the policy challenges were to the administration when they woke up on the morning of September 12th 2001. you know I, I know you were at Treasury, but and you have a very broad knowledge of these areas you know, can you try to give a sense of for a high level decision makers a catastrophe this magnitude happens. what is how was the President thinking about this? what is the, what are they trying to manage? What are the priorities in the early days of of a disaster of this magnitude. >> Alright. I think it's, it's important to keep in mind you know, that September 12, 2001 and then you know a year to two years out was really dominated In the policy-maker's minds and certainly the President's mind with the notion that we can never let this happen again. Certainly that became the theme of the Bush Administration, we could never allow this to happen again. But what was overriding in terms of a sense, both and not only for policy-makers, but also for the intelligence community, was that We actually didn't know it was coming. That September 12th was a period of, actually great fear and blindness in terms of what Al Qaeda might be planning next. I remember the sensibility that day frankly walking back to the Treasury Department for the streets of Washington. There was some activity but it was, it felt a bit like a ghost town. And it had some military vehicles driving up and down the, the streets and avenues in Washington. We were in a very different period. And there was a great forboding and, and sense of dread. As to what was coming next. And I remember looking at the calendar and each month that we passed without another attack I think we counted as a, as a lucky month. So I think one of the overriding themes, and I think it's important for students to keep in mind, was just how blind the American government felt as to what was coming next. And the overarching and policy goals of trying to gather as much information that would allow us to divine what maybe coming, as well as the ability then to disrupt activities. The, the very notion of actionable intelligence became sort of a coin of a realm in this, in this period. And I think that then drove a lot of the policy decisions that followed. >> So was is were the focus set on how do we get information or also defensive measures. How do we if something is happening, what are we going to do to try to stop it before you know, as, as we often say, you know, to the left of the boom. before something actually occurs. >> Alright. Yeah, yeah, I think an easy way of thinking about it is you had three categories of activities that as, as policy makers were thinking about. The first was gathering as much information and, and intelligence about not just ongoing plots but the networks itself. How is Al Qaeda actually distributed? How. have they embedded themselves either in the United States or elsewhere and how are they going to manifest the next threat and what does that look like? And, and keep in mind, when we hit 911, we had seen the escalation of attacks. And so the fear was that you're going to see a further escalation and 911 wasn't sort of the end of the story. It was just part of a progression. And so that first bucket was really let's get as much information as we can about the plots and the networks. Two, let's figure out how we can disrupt it. And that means sort of all of government powers and influence to try to do that. At Treasury it meant let's go after the finances. Lets figure out how we can disrupt. Money flow so that it interrupts or [INAUDIBLE] interrupts their networking. it also meant using intelligence more actively. How could we arrest more people? How could we get them? third I think it was a question of okay, how do we root this out longer term? Al Qaeda had established a safe-haven in Afghanistan. That's obviously going to have to be dealt with, Al Qaeda has roots in the other parts of the world, how do we build partnerships and capabilities to uproot them and deal with them, then there was really a sense that we have to deal with it immediate to defend the US, to defend ourselves. But also then to how do we reach out to affect and disrupt Al Qaeda abroad. And in that same vein, David as you mentioned, the defensive question was well how do we build up our defenses at ports and borders and that then later leads to the debate about creating a new department of Homeland Security. >> So you talked about how this had to be, by it's nature, a, a whole of government type of approach. how, how does a President and ultimately in the second administration, you, you were, closer to the White House, so you have some ideas about this. How does the President actually try to organize that to direct. a whole government approach to a, a new problem. What are some of the difficulties in doing that? You know, I think, you know, from a lay person, they say, well, the President barks out an order and all, all of a sudden it happens. but it, it's not that simple, is it? >> No, it's not but the President has certain authorities and mechanisms obviously at his command. That certainly help. And certainly what the President did was rely very heavily on his national security council. That is the, in the 1947 act that created the council. This, these are the senior cabinet members, like the secretary of defense, secretary of state, head of the CIA, and others who are part of his national security cabinet if you will. who then have the authority to do certain things and what the President does and what the cabinet does is look at the authorities and capabilities at hand as to how to deal with the problem. And so the secretary of state has the remet to do diplomacy abroad on behalf of the President. That's the, all the tools available. The secretary of defense has the military at his command. At the behest of the President, so what military tools do you have available? The intelligence community at the time, coordinated by the CIA, later by the director of national intelligence, has the intelligence resources. other elements of the government, like the Treasury Department, had, certain responsibilities. So the president looks at his authorities. tries to develop a strategy often driven by national security council staff and internally to say okay how do we get at this problem short-term long-term and what are the tools and authorities we have. Importantly, David, in this period there was also a very clear and important discussion about what authorities don't we have. That we need. and that leads to this important question as to how to view the problem of terrorism. And President Bush made very clear that he was going to view this as a war on terror. That is to say, this wasn't just a, a rhetorical tool. This was a real sort of paragma, pragmatic shift to say. We need the ability to use military tools and capabilities against this threat. and that leads to the authorization for the use of military force by Congress, September 18th 2001 and leads to obviously the invasion in Afghanistan and all sorts of other tools that were used under military authority. And so, the President will look at his authorities, look to his cabinet to help organize it, his National Security Adviser to help coordinate the strategy. and then you implement. And I think the hardest part of governance from the President's point of view is, making sure that The strategies, the tools his dictates then get implemented into strategy that you have the cooperation of Congress to help do that. >> well let's go back a little bit and, and your discussion about how it was, the, this effort was, was framed as a war on terror. It's interesting because you listed four or five different things. You talked about diplomacy. You talked about the treasury. You talked about law enforcement, defensive measures, and, and of course and you also mentioned military, but a lot of the authority, or a lot of the things that needed to be done were non-military, so. How did that work into or why was it then necessary to frame this conflict in terms of a war? >> I think, David, the challenge the President had at that time was, you, you clearly had the intelligence community, the law enforcement community, focused on Al Qaeda and terrorism. In, in a sense, and hard to match my experience prior to nine eleven, there were, there was a counter terrorism community that was trying to deal with this issue. the reality was though that we hadn't dealt with the problem with military tools in addition to the intelligence collection. In addition to the work of the FBI. In addition to work of prosecutors. and so there were certain tools and activities to include not just military but also treasury tools that needed to be amplified to, to go after this problem more aggressively. And I think part of this was a paradigmatic shift, not just toward the labeling this as a war on terror. To allow the use of military tools and authorities. More aggressively. But also a shift to a more preventative, predictive paradigm to how we are dealing with terrorism. So the, the, the proposition was no longer how do we react to an attack. How do we investigate it, how do we get intelligence about it. to hold people accountable post-facto. The shift became, not just let's use military force, but let's figure out how we use our tools to prevent these attacks. And that's why you see significantly within the FBI itself a shift toward a, a more intelligence-gathering mode as we've heard in the Homeland Security context, intelligence led policing to allow a more preventative paradigm. To say look, we're not going to let this happen again, we're going to do everything to prevent it, and to disrupt it, before the threats reach our shores. And I think that was a really important paradigmatic shift which is still having implication for how we think about law enforcement, intelligence and military force a today. >> absolutely and I think that a lot of those themes will, will come out in the second course that I'm going to be offering a, a. Nine 11 and it's aftermath part two. Which we'll focus a lot on those things. But let me just stick on this on one other point. was there any discussion or do you think there's any considerations of the, the potential cost of using the term war and, and implementing this paragramatic shift to more preventative that how this. Effort would be perceived abroad and whether in some ways it could complicate some of our desires to both tamp down the popularity, the Al Qaeda ideology, to gain cooperation of other states. whose populations so, might not be very receptive to a United States lead war in the Middle East and, and other places in, in the Muslim world. do you think those considerations were made, and if so, how were these potential downsides kind of dealt with in this, in this, in this framing of the conflict to come? >> It, it's a great question and there's no question, I fast forward a little bit to my experience at the White House maybe a precursor to your second course And I encourage kids to take it. but that was a huge part of the debate when I arrived in, in the White House. And, and I, I was in the middle of that debate as to the lexicon of what we were calling this. And part of that debate at the time in 2004, 2005 was You know this is a longer term issue. This isn't just about the truck being in a terrorist camp in Kandahar. Or a particular plot that may be coming to us from Europe. This is about a movement that is ideologically driven. That is trying to inspire a broader, sort of movement globally. And that presents a, potentially, a generational risk. And that this is more a battle of ideas, just as much as a battle of arms at the end of the day. And so. We need to think through how we can strew that, how we talk about it, how we label it. But back to 2001 I think the, the greatest consideration at that point was simply how do we articulate what we're going to be doing as a nation. that, that has both legal, political, and social consequence. And, I think what is often lost, in the debate about, the terminology here is that the President very much saw, the need to use the war, lexicon, to not only animate new tools like the military that we hadn't used against Al Qaeda in the past, to justify in the minds of the public invading Afghanistan, for example. But also to, to express a real desire that we are going to use all elements of power to include military power. To root out this problem and in a sense, this is where I differ with some of the critics about the, the use of the term, war on terror, because one of the things that the President was very much conscious of was, sort of, the impact here and, and, and how, for example, our European allies, in particular chaffed at the notion of a militant sort of notion of going after terrorism. Particularly when you had terrorist cells in cities like Paris or London, you know, you, you're not going to drop a bomb on somebody so what does this really mean. But, you know, the president in addition to wanting to give sort of a, a, a framing for how we were using military force also wanted to say look. terrorism in the 21st century can be cataclysmic and we have to find a way of delegitimating the very notion that there is legitimacy in the use of terror. That is to say violence directed at civilians for mass effect. That that, that can no longer be acceptable given what we just witnessed on nine 11 and given the potential of, for example, WMD and terrorism blending. And so for the President, it was, it was animating this notion that we're going to use the military, we're going to use all elements of national power. It's going to be global. But it's also conceptual battle against the very notion that terrorism can be legitimate. And I think that's often lost in the debate. And was part of the debate in' 04' 05, when people were saying, look we need to shift the lexicon here. You know, the President was very clear, look we are at war, we're at war with the ideology, we're at war with a group of people who are war with us. And if we're going to be using military force we're going to be putting men and women in harms way, we have to call it for what it is, we can't shy away from that. And we have to deal obviously with the consequences, but we can't ignore what it is that we're doing.
